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ABSTRACT
Starting from the premise that strategic interactions between 
countries influence trade policy decisions, this paper is a first attempt 
at exploring the possible outcomes of a trade dispute between Turkey 
and Russia, assuming that Turkey can lodge a complaint about Russia’s 
protectionist move to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
Employing the course of events during the recent economic conflict 
between the two countries, the article models the stages of a trade 
game wherein players exhibit non-cooperative behaviour. It finds 
that Turkey reporting Russia to the DSB depends on the cost of the 
dispute, which represents both economic losses and losses that can 
be considered disadvantages in a broader sense. The results show that 
in trade relations where asymmetric interdependence is observed, 
if both parties mutually commit to an international organisation, 
binding regulations may provide strategy options that are otherwise 
infeasible for the disadvantaged player.
1. Introduction
Political economy explanations of trade policies help us to understand the structure of 
trade protection as well as the process of related policy formation. Nevertheless, it is not 
possible most of the time to choose permanent policies towards trade, since interests of 
countries may change as production structures and development levels change. As a result, 
several forms of strategic interaction appear during the trade policy-making process, which 
require close scrutiny.
The extant literature on related research mostly consists of attempts to model trade 
relations in a game-theoretical framework, emphasising how trade policy strategies can be 
interpreted to the strategies of a game. Indeed, trade policy decisions fit well to the strategic 
nature of decisions in game theory, where each player anticipates the choices of the other 
player(s), before deciding which course of action to take over a number of possible actions.
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In most of the existing studies however, it is not the countries and their ex post trade 
strategies which are under focus, but some generalising trade outcomes and distribution of 
welfare due to different choices in the game. Therefore, the analyses are concentrated on the 
search for equilibrium in a trade game, and the findings do not provide policy suggestions. 
An example is the study by Gould and Woodbridge (1998), where the authors show that 
retaliation may result in liberalisation or may cause a trade war depending on the market 
characteristics of the trading countries.
In the limited number of empirical analyses, the focus of the research is on developed 
countries. Grossman and Helpman (1995) model a two-level game between two large open 
economies which possess market power in several industries and induce governments to 
impose optimal tariffs on each other in these industries. The governments of these two 
countries negotiate for the equilibrium tariffs, in a setting where retaliation and conciliation 
exist. Gawande and Li (2006) test this model by using bilateral trade barrier data between 
the United States and Japan, and between the US and the European Union. Using a global 
numerical trade model, Harrison and Rutström (1991) compute the outcome of a trilateral 
trade war between the US, the EU and Japan, and then a bilateral trade war between US 
and Canada.
More policy-oriented literature, relevant to the content of the present paper, approaches 
the dispute settlement issue between countries as resolving conflicts or liberalising trade. 
The analyses which seek to explain how global international regulators such as the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) may help achieve freer 
trade through a system of regulations fall into this category. In Abbot and Kallio’s (1996) 
study, the policy problem of large exporters in agriculture is framed as a prisoner’s dilemma 
game where General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) may serve moving the mar-
ket outcome closer to a cooperative solution, free trade in particular, if all trading parts 
cooperate. Bagwell and Staiger (2002) propose that the WTO’s reciprocity and enforce-
ment rules may offer a means of escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
Employing possible outcome scenarios of various trade policy measures within a game- 
theoretic framework, Lee and Kennedy (2007) attempt to determine the impact of Japanese 
and South Korean import policies on US rice exports. Using the tools of three-level game 
theory, Hwang and Kim (2014) analyse the negotiation strategies followed by the EU in 
the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations and find that a regional union 
which adopts a common commercial policy orients itself toward market liberalisation and 
openness as pursued by multilateralism such as the WTO.
In this study, a trade dispute game is constructed between Turkey and Russia in a non- 
cooperative game-theoretical framework. To the best of our knowledge, despite a number 
of earlier trade conflicts between the two countries, no study yet exists which, following 
our game-theoretic methodology, deals with a trade dispute between the two countries. 
Thus, by examining a hypothetical trade dispute between these important trade partners, 
this study supplements a lack in the literature and promises inferences to better understand 
trade policy-making in both countries.
One distinct element of our analysis is the employment of the course of events during 
the trade conflict between Turkey and Russia in November 2015 to constitute the stages of 
a trade game wherein players exhibit non-cooperative behaviour. There are views expressed 
by the international press that the reasons for Russia’s disputes with several countries ‘are not 
linked to genuine trade relations but are rather motivated by other political considerations’ 
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(Schewe, 2013, p. 1178). In this sense, Russia’s membership to the WTO in 2012 was hoped 
to ‘increase the transparency and predictability’ of the country’s trade policy moves (Schewe, 
2013, p. 1171). We therefore introduce WTO Dispute Settlement Body to our model in 
order to diversify possible strategies and related outcomes.
The game starts with a trade sanction initiated by Russia against Turkish imports, leading 
to a dispute with Turkey.1 Turkey in return notifies the DSB about Russia’s protectionist 
move, and the game evolves. In the model, we take inspiration from the commonly used 
basic game-theoretical structure and avoid more complex models. However, we depart from 
the existing research by identifying a trade conflict between two real economies asymmetric 
in size and strategic in bilateral trade, in a model which includes the reputational gains and 
losses of being involved in a dispute. We also introduce time-dependent variables in the 
game and assume that the payoffs differ. We further perform a repeated game in order to 
seek whether repetition of the same game might foster cooperation.
The study is structured as follows. The second section introduces the model and its var-
iables. The third section defines the stages followed by the designation of a setting where 
possible payoffs from a trade dispute are arranged. An extensive non-cooperative trade 
game between Turkey and Russia including the influence of the WTO is also presented in 
this section. The fourth section describes dominant strategies and Nash equilibria, followed 
by the repeated game. The fifth section offers concluding thoughts.
2. The model and the variables
In the analysis, the players, strategies and possible outcomes of a trade game are presented 
to define a trade dispute between Turkey and Russia. In the game, Turkey can notify to the 
DSB of Russia’s trade protectionist move.
Assume that Turkey is the complainant (TC) in a trade dispute with Russia, where the 
latter is the respondent (RR). That is, Russia has taken an action of trade restriction and is 
accused by Turkey of having violated the WTO law. The players, strategies and outcomes 
of the game can be seen in Figure 1. The nodes of the extensive form game are constituted 
according to the stages of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). Stages of the 
dispute where bilateral negotiations are likely to occur are also shown in Figure 1.
In the game, Turkey’s (Player 1) payoff is given before Russia’s (Player 2) payoff in paren-
theses and payoff components belonging to either Turkey or Russia are denoted by subscripts 
T and R respectively. The variables are defined as follows:
fT and fR: Gains from bilateral trade for Turkey and Russia respectively before Russia’s 
trade restrictions. The values of fT and fR may not be equal to each other since the economic 
gains derived from bilateral trade may be different for the two countries due to the com-
position and volume of trade.
t: Time period as a particular section of the dispute settlement process. t1 is the time 
period between trade restriction and notification, t2 is the period between notification 
and panel, t3 is the period between panel and appeal, t4 is the period between appeal and 
implementation appeal.
ct: Cost of Russia’s protectionist move for Turkey, including both the economic losses and 
losses that can be considered as disadvantages in a broader sense. ct is also the amount that 
Turkey demands from Russia as compensation and its value is assumed to be proportional 
to the time the trade restriction is in action, t.
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gt: Value that Russia gains due to its trade protectionist move, including both the eco-
nomic gains and the gains that can be considered as advantages in a broader sense. This 
may not be the same as ct, since such a protectionist move may bring additional gains to 
Russia due to its advantaged position2 in this particular trade dispute. The value of gt is also 
assumed to be proportional to the time the trade restriction is in action, t.
n: Amount that is subject to negotiation during the consultations which Russia would 
aim to subtract from the amount Turkey demands as compensation, 
[
0 ≤ n ≤ ct
]
. Though 
it is not possible to name the exact amount of n, it can be expected that Russia is going to 
have the bargaining power due to its high elasticity of demand3 for Turkish imports. Thus, 
for Russia, n is going to equal to 0 at worst and ct at best.
d: Legal and organisational cost of undergoing the dispute settlement system, or the eco-
nomic value of the dispute costs for each party in each turn of the dispute settlement process. 
For simplicity, we assume that the value of d is equal for both parties.4. If Turkey chooses to 
proceed in the game, the dispute costs will start to accumulate periodically (i.e. d, 2d, 3d, 4d).
racc, rl, rg: When a notification is made to the WTO, it is publicly known. racc is the repu-
tation loss for Russia of being accused in public. rl is the reputation loss to either Russia or 
bilateral free trade  
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Figure 1. a trade dispute game between turkey and Russia. source: author’s modelling.
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Turkey in case of a negative outcome of the dispute settlement process. rg is the reputation 
gain for either party in case of a positive outcome of the process.
x: Number of turns in the dispute process, [1 ≤ x ≤ 4]. With all alternating strategies 
and related outcomes in place, we construct four turns in the game, to be in line with the 
first four stages of a typical dispute settlement process within the WTO.5
p: Probability that Turkey’s notification is a case violating the WTO rules, due to the 
type of case which ‒ according to its magnitude, its match with various goals and priorities 





 on the other hand, is that the case is considered as discrepant by the 
WTO authorities.
The game is designed under the complete information assumption. Under this assump-
tion, both players are equally informed about their own case and the past WTO dispute 
cases. Thus, differences in the players’ expectations, if there are any, are negligible. The game 
is not played under perfect information, since in that case there would have been knowledge 
of actions inside the game.
It can be difficult to estimate exactly how a certain trade policy measure affects another 
country. Although trade conflicts have occurred between Turkey and Russia before, it would 
be hard to estimate the exact cost of a prospective dispute due to the dynamic nature of 
the trade volume and investment level between the two countries. However, as members 
of the WTO, both Turkey and Russia would have pre-information, based on earlier trade 
disputes among members, on the possible number of turns (x) before a dispute is solved, 
as well as on the probability that a case presented to the WTO would either be accepted (
p
)





3. Stages of the game
The theoretical framework presented in the analysis aims for the WTO to be involved in 
the setting as a mediator that the players of the game apply, in order to look for possible 
solutions to the trade dispute. Assuming that Turkey cannot implement retaliation measures 
independent from the WTO, if Turkey chooses to notify, then acceptance of the complaint 
by the organisation gives the country the opportunity to recover its costs.
Here, it should be noted that there is nothing Turkey can do to determine or to influence 
the form of the trade sanctions imposed by Russia. The sanctions are in their final form, 
designed by the owner country. Thus, as can be seen in the reduced game in Figure 2, all 
utilities after the panel is established, except for the dispute cost, are dependent on whether 
the case is accepted as a trade violation or not by the WTO authorities.
This requires Turkey to have a good observance and understanding of WTO rules and 
dispute settlement procedures in order to correctly estimate the evolution of the game. The 
unknown dispute cost is represented by xd.
When a player in a node is linked with another one with broken lines in the figure, it 
means that the player cannot determine which of these two nodes it is at when it must 
choose, but all possible payoffs are still known to both players, in line with the complete 
information assumption.
Going back to the extensive form game in Figure 1, evaluating the nodes of the game 
can provide policy suggestions and predictive outcomes. At the fourth node, there are two 
possible outcomes: either Russia is the loser of the panel report or Turkey is. Consider first 
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that the panel approves the case and that Russia is the loser of the report. If Russia chooses 
not to appeal, the panel report should be adopted within the period t3. In that case, utility 
to be derived is going to be:
 
If, on the other hand, Russia appeals but the case is approved, it has to adopt the report 
within the period t4 which leads to the expected payoff:
 
If Turkey is the loser of the panel report and chooses not to appeal, Russia will not have to 
step back from its trade sanctions. Thus, the loss for Turkey is going to be:
 
If, on the other hand, Turkey appeals, but the case is rejected by the Appellate Body, the 
country has to adopt the Appellate Body’s decision within a short period of time, t4. In that 
case, Turkey is going to be facing the utility:
 
Out of 501 disputes which have been brought to the WTO between 1995 and 2015, the 
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panel no panel 
(ct1-n-d, gt1- ct1+n-d-racc) 
(-d, gt2-d-racc) (-ct2-d, gt2-d-racc) (-ct2-d, gt2-d-racc) 
(-ct2-d, gt2-d-racc) 
Figure 2. Reduced form game. source: author’s modelling.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA  587
panel report. Among the 65 disputes, none of the Appellate Body reports has found that the 
Panel has completely erred in its legal findings.6 Indeed, most reports are not completely 
approving or dismissive but instead they approve some parts of the complaint and dismiss 
other. This indicates that the panel reports contain accurate decisions in a majority of the 
cases. Thus, Russia must either strongly believe the probability of its appeal being accepted 
is higher in this particular case or the amount of compensation Turkey demands (ct) must 
be very large in order to take the risk of appealing.
According to a local news agency, the economic cost of the trade dispute between Russia 
and Turkey in 2008 was around $1 billion at the time it was settled.7 Although the dispute 
lasted three months, the cost for the Turkish side accounted for almost one-fifth of the value 
of total exports from Turkey to Russia in 2007, which was $4.7 billion. According to an 
assessment by the EBRD economists, Russia’s sanctions against Turkey in November 2015 
are expected to ‘reduce Turkey’s GDP growth in 2016 by around 0.3‒0.7 percent, if they per-
sist over the year and are fully applied’. The same assessment shows, on the other hand, that 
‘the impact on Russia’s GDP will be limited, with some moderate pressure on import prices 
and inflation’.8 According to an economist’s statement to the BBC, ‘the cost for Turkey in lost 
business could be at least $10 billion’, while the country ‘risks losing $3.5 billion annually in 
income from Russian tourists, and another $4.5 billion annually through the cancellation 
of construction projects’.9 A report issued by one of Turkey’s biggest banks, Is Bankasi, on 
the impact of Russian sanctions, supports this estimate, with a ‘worst-case scenario amount 
of $7.3 billion’.10 Turkish Deputy Prime Minister also declares a close estimate of $9 billion, 
adding that ‘the tension is likely shave 0.3 to 0.4 percent off Turkey’s GDP’.11
In a dispute case, Turkey can demand dispute costs close to those put forward in these 
estimates as compensation from Russia, which in turn may cause Russia to take the risk to 
appeal. Besides, amounts as such may prompt Turkey to choose to notify the WTO about 
Russia in the first place when the trade dispute in question occurs.
Depending on Russia’s decision, Turkey could then either comply, or accept a defeat, or 
start retaliating. The latter two possibilities can affect future bilateral economic relations. 
Reflections of the retaliation possibility, for instance, can be seen on prospective investment 
projects as well as future trade contracts. If, on the other hand, the complaint is dismissed 




At the third node, Turkey is to choose either to demand the establishment of a panel or not. If 
it chooses not to demand the establishment of a panel, related utility function is going to be:
 

























= −ct2 − d,
(8)uTC (panel|approve) = p
(
ct3 − 2d + rg
)
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or:
 
depending on whether the case is approved or rejected by the panel, respectively. Thus, the 
complete utility function for Turkey for demanding a panel is:
 
Turkey chooses to demand a panel if:
 
Here it should be noted that not to demand a panel is not a rational strategy for Turkey 
once the country complains to the WTO. Since all utility functions are known in advance, 
Turkey would not choose not to demand a panel strategy if it knew that would be its best 
expected outcome when it could choose to do nothing in the first place and get 0 in return.
The second node represents the consultation process of the WTO’s dispute settlement, 
where in our setting Turkey and Russia try to reach a settlement on their own, based on 
negotiations. However, since all players’ utilities are supposed to be known from the begin-
ning in bargaining processes, each player knows which outcome one prefers over another. 
In this case, there is no need for bargaining at all since it is possible to trace the optimal 
mutually acceptable solution at once. Hence, if there is an agreement acceptable to every-
body, we may say directly what the agreement will be, and this agreement will be offered 
by the first player in the first round of the negotiation. The intuition behind this reasoning 
is based on the Rubinstein Bargaining Model (Morrow, 1994). In our game, the choice to 
offer the agreement or not belongs to Russia, as it is to choose whether to give Turkey an 
acceptable offer or not. This is consistent with the intuition that Russia in such a situation 
in reality would consider doing the same, due to its significant economic ties with Turkey. 
It should be noted here that although Turkey is in a relatively disadvantaged position in its 
trade with Russia, Russia too has gains from this relationship not to be easily forsaken. On 
the other hand, since it is Russia who is assumed to have initiated the trade violation, and 
is the advantaged party, one may expect it to have the bargaining power in this process.
At this node, the value of n will be subject to negotiation. Turkey would prefer n to be 
equal to zero and Russia would prefer n to be equal to ct. If we assume that Russia makes 
the offer, it will start by offering Turkey nothing (n = ct). However, an offer at this stage 





otherwise it is unacceptable for Turkey. This means that Turkey will only accept offers 
where n < 2 − ct2.
When choosing whether to offer an acceptable size of n to Turkey or not, Russia’s deci-
sion will depend on whether it prefers the payoff that the settlement strategy will produce 
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)
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or:
 




Russia’s utility function for settling with Turkey is:
 
The decision equation for Russia at this point is to settle if
 
At the beginning, Russia chooses between free trade and initiating a trade restriction. Given 
that Russia draws a protectionist measure in its trade with Turkey, at the first node Turkey 
should decide whether to convey the case to the WTO level, by notifying the DSB. Turkey 
is assumed to have zero while Russia is assumed to have gt − fR, as the respective payoffs, 
when Turkey chooses the strategy ‘do nothing’. Here, Turkey should compare two utility 
functions, given that it notifies, that Russia chooses to settle and that Russia chooses not 







rg − rl − 4d
)
− ct3 − 2d respectively. Turkey chooses to notify if it knows 
that the relevant function is greater than zero (which will be the outcome if it does not notify 
at all); otherwise it would not notify. As of January 2016, more than 80% of the complaints 
brought to the WTO have been approved. Thus, the high probability that the case would 
be approved would be crucial for the players, confirming the implications of the analysis.
4. Dominant strategies and Nash equilibria
In order to find out the dominant strategies, the game can also be shown in strategic form 
as in Table 1. Out of six strategies (and four relevant payoffs) shown in the table, it is then 









gt3 − 2d + rg
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(14)uRR(notsettle) = uR(panel|approve) + uR(panel|reject)
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rg + gt3 − 2d
(17)uRR(settle) = gt2 − ct2 + n − d








rg + gt3 − 2d
Table 1. strategic form game.
TC (Turkey)
RR (Russia)
Strategies Settle (S) Not settle (NS)
Notify, no panel (N-NP)  (ct
2




+ n − d − racc)  (−ct2 − d, gt2 − d − racc)
Notify, panel (N-P)  (ct
2




+ n − d − racc)  (pc − xd, gt2 − pc − xd − racc)
Not notify (Nn)  ( - ct1, gt1 - fR)  ( - ct1, gt1 - fR)
source: author’s modeling.
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Nash equilibria:
1.   Notify, No Panel; Settle (N-NP; S) ‒ false
2.   Notify, no panel; Not Settle (N-NP; NS) – false
3.   Notify, Panel; Settle (N-P; S) – true
 
4.   Notify, Panel; Not Settle (N-P; NS) – true
 
 
5.   Not notify; Settle (Nn; S) – false
6.   Not notify; Not settle (Nn; NS) ‒ false
 
PTC(N − NP; S) ≥ PTC(N − P, S) = ct2 − n − d ≥ ct2 − n − d(true)
PTC(N − NP; S) ≥ PTC(Nn, S) = ct2 − n − d ≥ ct1(true)
PR(N − NP; S) ≥ PR(N − NP,NS) = gt2 − ct2 + n − d − racc ≥ gt2 − d − racc(false)
PTC(N − NP; NS) ≥ PTC(N − P,NS) = −ct2 − d ≥ pc − xd(false)
PTC(N − NP; NS) ≥ PTC(Nn,NS) = −ct2 − d ≥ −ct1(false)
PR(N − NP; NS) ≥ PR(N − NP, S) = gt
2
− d − racc ≥ gt2 − ct2 + n − d − racc(true)
PTC(N − P; S) ≥ PTC(N − NP, S) = ct
2
− n − d ≥ ct
2
− n − d(true)
PTC(N − P; S) ≥ PTC(Nn, S) = ct2 − n − d ≥ −ct1(true)
PR(N − P; S) ≥ PR(N − P,NS) = gt2 − ct2 + n − d − racc ≥ gt2 − pc − xd − racc(true)
PTC(N − P; NS) ≥ PTC(N − NP,NS) = pc − xd ≥ −ct2 − d(true)
PTC(N − P; NS) ≥ PTC(Nn,NS) = pc − xd ≥ −ct1(true)
PR(N − P; NS) ≥ PR(N − P, S) = gt2 − pc − xd − racc ≥ gt2 − ct2 + n − d − racc(true)
PTC(Nn; S) ≥ PTC(N ,N − P; S) = −ct1 ≥ ct2 − n − d.(false)
PTC(Nn; S) ≥ PTC(N ,P; S) = −ct1 ≥ ct2 − n − d(false)
PR(Nn; S) ≥ PR(Nn; NS) = gt1 − fR ≥ gt1 − fR(true)
PTC(Nn; NS) ≥ PTC(N − NP,NS) = −ct1 ≥ −ct2 − d(true)
PTC(Nn; NS) ≥ PTC(N − P,NS) = −ct1 ≥ pc − xd(false)
PR(Nn; NS) ≥ PR(Nn; S) = gt1 − fR ≥ gt1 − fR(true)
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Out of six possible strategies in the game, the third and the fourth strategies seem to be 
Nash equilibria, which are N − P, S and N − P,NS respectively. These results show that 
once Russia imposes the sanctions against Turkey, Turkey as a rational player with complete 
information will always choose to notify and to panel, no matter if the countries settle or 
not in the end. Therefore the strategic form game can be reduced to the following form 
shown in Table 2.
5. Repeated game
In real economic relations, players usually do not interact once and for all as in single shot 
games. In cases where a dispute has occurred, recurrence of the game is even more mean-
ingful to alter the non-cooperative outcome. Therefore, a repeated game is performed in 
this section to portray whether cooperation might be fostered.
Klimenko, Ramey, and Watson (2008) have shown that external enforcement might 
serve achieving cooperation in recurrent trade agreements, particularly when mecha-
nisms such as delays in dispute settlement and direct penalties are activated. We take 
inspiration from this idea and the model’s basic assumptions. The authors build their 
model on the choice of tariff levels within trade agreements; instead, we adapt the idea to 
our stage game where the game starts with a dispute between Turkey and Russia. Turkey 
complains about Russia to the DSB and the countries negotiate on a compensation set 
to reach agreed-upon tariffs to proceed with pre-dispute bilateral trade. Complete infor-
mation assumption holds in the repeated game and the DSB still exists as the institution 
to which players can apply in cases as needed. The DSB is further assumed to be keeping 
the history of the previous trade violations, complaints, negotiations and settlements. In 
the stage game, it was found that Turkey would always choose to notify and further panel 
once Russia implemented trade sanctions. This finding is embraced in the repeated game. 
By doing so, it is guaranteed that the presence of the DSB, when actively utilised, makes 
a difference in terms of the outcome.
Following Klimenko et al. (2008), it is assumed that the dispute solution within the DSB’s 
dispute settlement process takes place with delay. Since policies chosen by the countries 
during the dispute resolution process do not matter for the DSB in terms of settlement, 
the players are likely to choose Nash equilibrium strategies. However, the countries are 
aware of the cost that the delay in dispute settlement entails, which in turn might foster 
cooperation.
The punishment mechanism for the defecting player in the repeated game works in two 
ways. First, after defection, the payoff for the defecting player is lower than the cooperative 
strategy payoff but the joint value of the relationship is still valid. In this setting, bargain-
ing power is not fixed and assumed to be dependent on the history. In other words, if one 
player defects from cooperation it is going to have a reduced bargaining power and less of 





Settle (S) Not settle (NS)
Notify, panel (N-P)  (ct
2




+ n − d − racc)  (pc − xd, gt2 − pc − xd − racc)
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Consistent with the 2015 dispute between Turkey and Russia, we assume that the period 
starts with a ‘dispute state’ as denoted by the DSB. This is where the dispute settlement 
process begins, and if settlement is achieved, DSB switches the state immediately from 
‘dispute’ to ‘cooperation’ with probability p. Note that this probability is exogenous, and 
cannot be raised or lowered by the players, implying that dispute settlement process cannot 
be influenced by the disputing members. Countries continue negotiating henceforth, under 
the assumption that their negotiation strategies depend on history. Immediate switching 
vice versa, from ‘cooperation’ to ‘dispute state’ as soon as a trade violation occurs, is in line 
with our finding in the stage game that Turkey always chooses to notify the WTO’s DSB 
about Russia.
When the DSB switches the state from ‘dispute’ to ‘cooperation’, countries choose from a 
set of payoffs UC and report it to the DSB. If the dispute cannot be resolved, with the prob-
ability of 1 ‒ p, the state remains as ‘dispute’ in the next period, independent of the actions 
chosen by the players in the current period. This time, countries choose from a set of UD, 
which in principle can be identical to UC.
For given sets of UC and UD, expected continuation payoffs can be as follows, implying 









2) is chosen from UD, with probabilities p and 1‒p respectively.




 is supportable in state s, s = C,D, if there are agreed tariffs (𝜏1, 𝜏2) 
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When the game is in the dispute state, all continuation payoffs are chosen from UE. Once 
the ‘cooperation state’ is achieved, deviation from agreed tariffs 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 leads to the ‘dispute 
state’, where continuation payoffs are again from UE.
We denote the set of payoff profiles that are supportable in state s by SS (UC, UD). UC 









 maximises the sum of the countries’ payoffs on the set SS and (UC, UD). This 





2) such that each player gets an equal share of the joint value which is 
defined relative to a disagreement point consistent with agreement in the following period 
(for i = 1, 2), 
where:
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Continuation payoffs are always chosen from UC or UD, but the countries cannot change 
the state as part of their agreement.
Within this framework, Klimenko et al. (2008) provides evidence that dispute costs, in 
particular the high ones, foster cooperation. This finding seems reasonable for our setting in 
that both reputation and dispute settlement costs cannot be negligible for trading partners 
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6. Conclusion
Over the last two decades, Turkey and Russia have become major trading partners and 
energy cooperation is the most significant component of this trade relation. Nevertheless, 
economic relations between the two countries depicts a lopsided characteristic in favour 
of Russia due to Turkey’s dependence on Russian gas. To rate the extent to which Russia 
may use this advantage as an actor in trade disputes, we present a game-theoretical model 
with all possible moves and outcomes of a WTO dispute settlement process between the 
two countries. With all the basic assumptions in place and the expected best moves for each 
player revealed, we find that the variables ct and p are essential in our setting. That is, we 
find under a complete information assumption that Turkey chooses to convey the case to 
the DSB if the value of the dispute cost in question is not negligible and that with higher 
probability it expects – based on information about earlier cases – that its complaint will 
be approved.
The flow of the game shows that if the players cannot settle and the case reaches a panel, 
the players’ payoffs in the following nodes vary according to the panel’s legal findings and 
to whether Russia complies or not. If Russia does not comply, Turkey may either choose to 
retaliate or it lodges an implementation appeal. It may also choose to do nothing. If Turkey 
chooses the implementation appeal strategy, it will have to face higher dispute costs and 
there is no guarantee whether its appeal will be approved. On the other hand, if Turkey 
chooses to retaliate, the countermeasure(s) should be constituted to cover the size equal to 
its economic loss caused by Russia’s protectionist move. In such a case, Turkey should have 
previously made progress at least in finding markets alternative to Russia, with comparable 
transportation costs for its exports, in addition to its import demand elasticity for natural 
gas imports. Otherwise, the retaliation option would not be beneficial.
Another finding of our analysis is that in the consultation process, the choice to offer 
a mutually acceptable offer for agreement belongs to Russia as the first player in the first 
round. We also show in our model that not to demand a panel is not a rational strategy for 
Turkey once the country notifies to the WTO.
Finally, repeating the stage game may contribute to achieving cooperation in that both 
reputation and dispute settlement costs for the two countries are not negligible.
Recent trade conflicts between the two countries make the research up-to-date, rele-
vant and of current importance for international economic relations. Continuation of the 
analysis provided in this study might encourage and shape the further development of the 
relationship between Turkey and Russia to a new level even more cooperative in all spheres, 
thus making relations healthier.
Notes
1.  This assumption starting the game is strongly in line with real life. Russia imposed a series of 
economic sanctions against Turkey after Turkey downed a Russian warplane in November 
2015. These sanctions included a ban on Turkish imports of certain agricultural produce and 
food, prohibition of hiring new Turkish workers and restriction of future Turkish economic 
activities, a 75% reduction in the number of international road transport permits for Turkish 
companies, reinforcing safety controls in Russian waters and seaports; abeyance of bilateral 
economic cooperation programmes and commissions, a ban on bilateral charter flights, a 
recommendation by the state tourism agency to suspend sales of Turkey holidays to Russian 
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citizens and cancellation of visa-free travel for Turkish citizens to Russia (http://www. 
ebrd.com/news/2015/economic-implications-of-russias-sanctions-against-turkey.html). 
After demanding a personal apology from Turkish President Erdoğan for months, Kremlin 
announced on 27 June 2016 that Erdoğan had expressed his regrets over the incident and 
that ‘was ready to do everything possible to restore friendly ties’ (https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2016/jun/27/kremlin-says-erdogan-apologises-russian-jet-turkish). In turn, 
Russian Prime Minister Medvedev said that the economic sanctions against Turkey will be 
lifted gradually (http://aa.com.tr/en/economy/russia-to-lift-sanctions-on-turkey-gradually-
pm-/600593). In mid-July 2016, the Kremlin stated that Putin had called Erdoğan about 
the coup d’état attempt in Turkey, ‘telling him that Russia found anti-constitutional acts and 
violence unacceptable and was hoping for the restoration of order and stability in Turkey’ 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-putin-idUSKCN0ZX0C8?il=0).
2.  According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Turkey 
covers almost 56% of its energy imports from Russia (http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/
economic-implications-of-russias-sanctions-against-turkey.html). There is also a proposed 
gas pipeline project named Turkish Stream between the two countries with a total annual 
capacity of 63 billion cubic metres (bcm) of which the first string would be carrying gas to 




Russia’s ratification of economic sanctions against Turkey, the Russian Energy Minister had 
announced that the project was suspended. However; on 29 December 2015, the Minister said 
Russia was interested in resuming the project (http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/russia-gas-
supply-turkey-resume-turkish-stream). During trade conflicts that have occurred between 
the two countries so far, it has always been a topic of interest whether Turkey’s large and 
increasing dependence on Russian energy may encourage Moscow to attempt to use its gas 
supply as leverage (http://en.trend.az/world/turkey/2435688.html).
3.  There are studies which verify this statement. Uz finds in her study that the demand for 
Turkey’s imports from Russia are more inelastic as compared to imports from other countries 
(Uz, 2010, p. 67). Due to the composition of trade between the two countries, it is possible 
to assume that Russia may substitute ‘Turkish exports ‒ of which foodstuffs constitute 20 
percent, with other major items including textiles, vehicles and machinery’ ‒ elsewhere (http://
www.ebrd.com/news/2015/economic-implications-of-russias-sanctions-against-turkey.html).
4.  Bown and Hoekman (2005) estimate a ‘litigation only’ cost of dispute to be at least US$500,000 
per turn in typical trade disputes within the WTO DSM process (Bown & Hoekman, 2005, 
p. 870). Therefore, for a possible trade dispute between Turkey and Russia, this amount can 
be a proxy. By doing so, it becomes possible to estimate costs to bear and utilities to gain 
for Turkey on starting a complaint or on proceeding in the further stages of the dispute 
settlement process.
5.  When a complaint is made to the WTO, should no agreement be reached in the first stage 
after 60 days of consultations between the disputing parties, the complainant can request 
the establishment of a panel in the second stage, which has to come to a conclusion in six 
months. In the third stage, both parties have the right to appeal. If the respondent is found 
guilty, it has to correct its measures in ‘a reasonable period of time’, which may be determined 
by member proposals, the DSB, parties in dispute or by an arbitrator. Thirty days after a 
‘reasonable period’ expires, the DSB approves the retaliation measures against the respondent 
which are supposed to compensate the effects of the protectionist measures. For a flow chart 
of the dispute settlement process, see https://www.wto.org/English/Tratop_E/dispu_e/disp_
settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm
6.  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm
7.  Türkiye-Rusya gümrük restleşmesinde iki taraf da kaybediyor, 2 September 2008, available at 
http://www.haberler.com/turkiye-rusya-gumruk-restlesmesinde-iki-taraf-da-haberi (accessed 
26 January 2016).
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